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The conference organizers have asked me to launch or keynote this conference.
The conference recognizes that this year, 1998, by treaty language, is the year
for review of the new WTO dispute settlement system. This conference is one
of the first to explore review issues after a few years of experience with the
system. We have an extraordinary wealth of talent here and I congratulate the
conference organizers on what they have assembled. We have a lot ahead of us
indeed.
Now, how do we think about these issues? There are an enormous number
of details. I suppose we first need to think about appraising what has happened
in the WTO dispute settlement process in the first several years. My perspective
is that it has been an enormously successful launch. It has actually been a more
successful launch than many people anticipated. Despite this success, there remain
a number of problems. There are a number of different issues that one could
focus on, especially the very heavy use of the dispute settlement process. There
are indications that this process is in a sense the jewel of the crown of the new
system, of the WTO and of the continuation of GATT. There are a number of
government indications of satisfaction (except of course when a government loses
a case; then it has dissatisfaction for a while). In general, it seems to have been
launched very well and the improvements over pre-WTO days are meaningful.
Most of you are familiar with the improvements including the fact that there
is no longer a blocking possibility at the end of the road in connection with
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the report of the dispute settlement process. Thus, we have something called
"automaticity." There are a number of other improvements that have been made
which I won't detail because my time is very short, but those improvements have
really made the system better. They have given the WTO a higher degree of
integrity and credibility. It has become a system that is more judicialized. Some
people would challenge whether that is good. My perspective and I suspect that
of many here, is that this is good because it provides a fundamental amount of
certainty or predictability in the system-the vital system of international and
globalized trade relations on which millions of entrepreneurs can begin to depend.
This predictability, however, is not perfect. Much ambiguity remains in the
system. The amount of ambiguity in the treaty texts is completely understandable
given the difficulty of negotiating a treaty with more than 130 countries. There is
now, however, a somewhat higher degree of predictability. Evidence of increased
predictability can be seen in a number of cases being settled before they go to
panel. These settlements may be recognition that participants are beginning to
see the handwriting on the wall and are predicting what the system would do if
allowed to go all the way through the panel process. Thus, settlements will adjust
accordingly. The increased number of settlements is perfectly in accord with
many national legal systems. For instance, the tort system in the United States
would totally collapse if ninety-five percent of the cases weren't settled. There-
fore, this increase is to be recognized as an attribute. On balance I think we can
say, with satisfaction, that the system has experienced a good launch.
Everyone can come forward with a series of potential changes in a year of
review. Indeed, governments have started that process themselves, and there
have been discussions in the Secretariat as well. Some of the lists are quite long-
50, 60, or 100 items. A number of the items on these lists are fairly small points
such as timetables that can have fairly vital impact on the system. Certainly these
small items need to be examined. However, I hope that we won't lose sight of
some of the broader systemic issues involved in these recommendations. Before
I turn to a very short list of these broader issues for your consideration, I also
want to point out that there are very significant issues of implementation of any
change in the procedures. Indeed, in some of my writings I've already indicated
the way the WTO Charter was circumscribed in the various decision-making
capacities of various entities. Even before the 1994 debate, the Congress was
concerned about the sovereignty of the United States.' Both I and others have
testified that when you compare the WTO to GATT, the sovereignty (whatever
that means, and that's an enormous question itself) is certainly better protected
under the constitution of the WTO in the sense that decision-making is more
constrained. There are more qualifications on how decisions are made in the
WTO Charter, many of these inserted in the last two or three months of negotia-
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tion. There are things such as supermajority requirements for certain kinds of
activities that will make it harder to make certain types of decisions. One of
those constraints is embedded in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
The DSU calls for decisions by the supervising body, the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB), which in turn is the General Council of the Organization wearing
another hat. Nevertheless, it is technically the DSB. Decisions by the DSB must
be by consensus, or what we sometimes call "full consensus," because there
are other provisions in the WTO Charter for consensus decisions which have a
voting fallback-if a consensus fails you can go to a certain kind of majority or
supermajority vote. In the DSU there's no fallback, only full consensus. Thus,
it could be very difficult to change the DSU or for the DSB to even make decisions
about it. I have worried in the broader context that the negotiators, caught up
in the political desire to have these constraints on decision-making in the WTO,
went a little too far. There may be too many constraints that could endanger the
Organization by making it too rigid and unable to accommodate some of the
fast-moving changes that we see in international economics.
This same problem exists under the dispute settlement process. Under the
GATT, the genius of the dispute settlement process was trial-and-error because
the language on dispute settlement was very brief. The GATT contained a few
paragraphs while the DSU has thirty pages and ancillary texts of various kinds.
So, the GATT process started out one way. Then, there was an experiment
shifting from working parties to panels and introducing concepts like "prima
facie nullification or impairment." These practices evolved, and at the end of
that evolution the GATT dispute procedures were recognized as a very interesting,
perhaps unique, international institution that had lots of merit-enough merit to
attract other subject-matter interest groups such as intellectual property and ser-
vices into the system. Now, it may be very hard for that to continue. It may be
very hard to let practice generate new modes of operation in the dispute settlement
process because of the added constraints. These constraints create an overriding
systemic problem that I'm sure we'll encounter in various discussions today. As
we discuss various ideas for change, we must also consider how changes would
be implemented. There are about six or seven different ways to implement.
Sometimes certain informal methods will work while sometimes there will have
to be a decision by a DSB or an agreement between disputing parties. We could
even get to the point of a formal interpretation that now requires a three-fourths
vote of all members, and not just those present. Usually more than a quarter of
the members are absent, so it's not going to be easy to get a three-fourths vote.
The amending itself is going to be extremely difficult. It was very difficult under
the GATT, so difficult that in the Tokyo Round there was no intention to amend.
Instead, they proceeded with the so-called "side agreements." The method the
Uruguay Round used to get around the amendment problem was simply to throw
out the old and start over with a new treaty. Negotiating a new treaty was the
legal technique used to avoid having to conform with the amending clause of
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the GATT. The GATT was not amended; everyone simply departed from the
GATT and took on the new agreement, which includes the GATT text in Annex 1.
Consequently, we have to think of various other ways to implement any proposed
changes.
What are some of the more systemic issues that I've talked about? While this
is not a complete catalog by any means, I, as have others, have tried to begin
developing a fairly elaborate inventory. Frieder Roessler, who's here in the
audience and is a speaker today, and I are teaching a joint seminar on this subject
this term which is proving very interesting. I wish to express some gratitude to
Frieder for some of his ideas that have influenced me on some of these points.
I thought I'd just mention a few points to consider.
One issue I've already discussed is the problem of consensus decisions. Another
is a jurisprudential issue which is very fundamental, and we're seeing it play
out in an extremely interesting way. That issue is the role of the dispute settlement
appellate body, or the dispute settlement system and the appellate body in particu-
lar, with respect to how they handle national government decisions. That includes
how much deference they're prepared to give to national government decisions.
This is sometimes referred to as a "standard of review."
This phrase "standard of review" has several different connotations; we have
to be careful what we're talking about. There's standard of review of the lower
panel results as well as standard of review of facts and law. However, what I'm
talking about here is the notion of how intrusive the ultimate appellate body panel
or division should be with respect to national government decisions that sometimes
involve delicate compromises of internal political forces or social systems. Let
me throw out a hypothesis: Compared to the first-level panels-which tend to
be operating more in the mode of the GATT and the tradition of the GATT,
which is not only appropriate but called for by the WTO charter in the so-called
"guidance clause' '-the Appellate Body seems to be somewhat more deferential
to national decision-making, and somewhat more willing to tolerate different
kinds of government approaches. I offer that as a hypothesis; you can read these
very interesting Appellate Body reports in a number of different ways, but that's
one to think about.
The next issue, transparency, goes to the democratic context. The question
is, can't more of the system be public? In fact, the transparency of the new system
is much better than the GATT, and I congratulate the participants in that respect.
However, there's still a question of whether it shouldn't be more open, more
available to the public in a variety of ways. Very closely related to that is the
question of the participation of non-government parties, groups, or organizations.
They are demanding to be let inside the door, and the question is how can that
be done in an appropriate way, without letting things get out of hand and consume
a huge amount of resources. These hearings could be very resource-intensive if
many are permitted to attend. There are a lot of longer-term issues of that type.
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Another issue that we've seen in several cases already, such as the Reformulated
Gasoline and the Hormones cases, is the question of scientific factual basis for
decisions. How are these international panels, with very limited resources, going
to be able to approach scientific evidence?
The final point I'll mention here is the question of linkages. How should we
link to the policies of liberal trade other policies such as environmental protection,
or even human rights, and everyone has a fairly long list.
That's enough grist for the day, and I'm sure we can't even get to all of that.
I do tend to think that the result of the 1998 review will likely be fine-tuning
and not a probe of systemic issues. I do not think it's too early to start thinking
more broadly, because in a few years, more changes will be necessary.
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